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近日，我院汪紫珈老師合作論文“Optimal selling mechanisms with buyer price search”在國際頂尖期刊Journal of Economic Theory正式發表。

1.內容摘要

We study optimal dynamic selling mechanisms in a two-stage model where the buyer can search for a better price at the second stage. When this outside price is public, the optimal selling mechanism takes the form of a fixed first-stage price with price matching in the second stage. In contrast, when the outside price is the buyer's private information, the optimal mechanism is a menu of two contracts: a first-stage sale at a higher price with immediate delivery, or a first-stage sale at a lower price with second-stage delivery. Thus the optimal form of search deterrence depends on the observability of the buyer's outside option.

2.作者簡介

汪紫珈，2014年6月畢業于武漢大學數理經濟與數理金融專業，2020年獲得新加坡國立大學經濟學博士學位。主要研究領域為應用微觀理論，主攻機制設計、競爭理論和拍賣理論方面的研究。2020年9月汪紫珈加入中國人民大學經濟學院企業經濟學與網絡經濟學教研室。