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講座時間：2025年5月27日10:30-12:00

講座地點：明德主樓734

主講人：鳳迪（東北財經(jīng)大學(xué)金融學(xué)院講師）

主持人：趙瑋（中國人民大學(xué)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)院講師）

主題：What makes the difference: deriving characterizations of the deferred acceptance mechanism and the immediate acceptance mechanism from basic properties

內(nèi)容簡介：

In this paper, we investigate many-to-one matching problems involving the allocation of indivisible objects (e.g., school seats) to agents (e.g., students) under capacity constraints and exogenously given priorities. Two widely used mechanisms in this context are the Deferred Acceptance mechanism (DA) and the Immediate Acceptance mechanism (IA).

We focus on basic properties that align with three standard objectives—efficiency, fairness, and incentives: non-wastefulness, fair treatment of equals, truncation-proofness, and anti-truncation-proofness. Both DA and IA satisfy all these basic properties. We then demonstrate that strengthening only one type of property results in DA or IA being the unique mechanism that satisfies all properties. Put precisely, we show that, given the basic properties we consider, (1) strengthening the basic fairness property to fairness, or the basic incentive properties to strategy-proofness, makes DA the only mechanism that satisfies all properties; and (2) strengthening the basic efficiency property to favoring higher ranks, makes IA the only mechanism that satisfies all properties.

Our approach and results highlight the clear distinctions between DA and IA with respect to the three standard objectives. These findings provide valuable insights for practical market design.

個人簡介：

Di Feng is an Assistant Professor in the Finance Department at Dongbei University of Finance and Economics. Prior to it, he earned his Ph.D. in economics from the University of Lausanne (HEC Lausanne), and served as a Postdoctoral Fellow at Simons Laufer Mathematical Sciences Institute (formerly known as the Mathematical Sciences Research Institute) in Berkeley. He also holds the position of a Junior Research Fellow at Research Institute for Economics and Business Administration, Kobe University.

He uses tools from game theory, operations research, psychology, and computer science to study how different markets / mechanisms affect the incentives and motivations of participants, and the corresponding economic outcomes.

His research has been published in leading academic journals and conferences, including Games and Economic Behavior, Journal of Mathematical Economics, IEEE INFOCOM, and WINE.