產業經濟學seminar

【時間】2016年12月22日（周四）12：00－13：30

【地點】明主734          【主講】李新宇 德國Paderborn大學研究員          【主題】Does vertical integration increase product quality          【點評】李三希          【摘要】Numerous product quality scandals are caused by low quality inputs. When downstream firms cannot perfectly observe the quality of their inputs, upstream firms have moral hazard problems. If vertical integration per se does not eliminate the moral hazard problems, do downstream firms still have incentives to integrate upstream firms to improve product quality? We find that given the precision of the downstream firms` monitoring, when the public monitoring level is very high or very low downstream firms have no incentive to integrate; when the public monitoring level is medium downstream firms have incentives to integrate. In addition, under vertical integration firms always produce high quality products.          【主講人介紹】          李新宇，荷蘭Maastricht大學經濟學博士，德國Paderborn大學研究員。研究領域為產業組織理論，信息經濟學，行為經濟學。已經在Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, PLoS ONE等國際知名期刊上發表多篇論文。          歡迎相關領域老師和同學關注并參加！如有意作為點評老師或宣講學生參加前沿文獻選讀活動，可以聯系經濟學院李三希老師 （sanxi@ruc.edu.cn）或者學生助理陳奕辰（chenyichen@ruc.edu.cn）。