[行為和實(shí)驗(yàn)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)研討會]The Cooperative Consequences of Contests
發(fā)文時(shí)間:2019-03-08

         行為和實(shí)驗(yàn)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)研討會          (總第5期)      
【時(shí)  間】2019年3月14日(周四)12:00—13:30  
【地  點(diǎn)】明德主樓734會議室  
【主  題】The Cooperative Consequences of Contests  
【主講人】鄭捷(清華大學(xué)經(jīng)濟(jì)管理學(xué)院經(jīng)濟(jì)系副教授)  
【主持人】王湘紅(中國人民大學(xué)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)院教授)  
【點(diǎn)評人】孫文凱(中國人民大學(xué)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)院教授)  
 
【講座摘要】Although contests are theoretically recognized as a highly effective method of motivation when resources are limited, recent studies (Carpenter, Matthews and Schirm, 2010; Buser and Dreber, 2016) suggest that the competitive nature of contests may induce negative behavioral externalities in other domains. Using a laboratory experiment of real effort contests with treatments varying by prize structure, we test the effect of different types of contests and their outcomes on pro-social behavior in classic games. Within-person effects of the contest on behavior in the prisoner’s dilemma, trust game and public goods game are assessed. Across subjects, we examine the relative impacts of standard all-pay auction contests, Tullock contests with probabilistic winning, proportional prizes and piece rate payment with social comparison. While pro-sociality generally decreases after a competition, it decreases most significantly in the proportional contest and piece rate with social comparison settings, driven mostly by greater anti-social action taken in the prisoner’s dilemma and trust games. Our study has managerial consequences for the structure incentives in the workplace when a combination of competition and cooperation is needed among workers.  
 
【主講人簡介】鄭捷,清華大學(xué)經(jīng)濟(jì)管理學(xué)院經(jīng)濟(jì)系副教授,清華大學(xué)經(jīng)濟(jì)管理學(xué)院經(jīng)濟(jì)科學(xué)與政策實(shí)驗(yàn)室(ESPEL)常務(wù)副主任,國際學(xué)術(shù)期刊Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization副編輯(Associate Editor),Research in Economics副編輯(Associate Editor)。2003年獲得清華大學(xué)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)學(xué)士學(xué)位,2005年獲得清華大學(xué)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)碩士學(xué)位,2007年獲得美國華盛頓大學(xué)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)碩士學(xué)位,2011年獲得華盛頓大學(xué)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)博士學(xué)位。研究領(lǐng)域主要包括經(jīng)濟(jì)理論、信息經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)、實(shí)驗(yàn)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)、行為經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)。先后主持多項(xiàng)國家自然科學(xué)基金項(xiàng)目,發(fā)表論文二十余篇。研究工作發(fā)表于Management Science、Nature Communications、American Economic Review (Papers and Proceedings)、Games and Economic Behavior、Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization、Experimental Economics等國際期刊,且有部分工作被收錄入Handbook of Experimental Economic Methodology,學(xué)術(shù)成果被中國信息經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)會授予"中國信息經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)2011-2015理論貢獻(xiàn)獎(jiǎng)",2016-2018連續(xù)三年獲“中國信息經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)青年創(chuàng)新獎(jiǎng)”。