中國人民大學(xué)企業(yè)與組織研究中心 組織經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)Seminar   總第71期 【OE201603】  
組織經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)（Organizational Economics）Seminar由中國人民大學(xué)企業(yè)與組織研究中心（CFOS）主辦。CFOS的宗旨是，利用現(xiàn)代經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)方法研究中國的企業(yè)、政府、市場和非營利組織的重大問題，推動(dòng)企業(yè)理論、契約理論和制度經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)的研究與教學(xué)。關(guān)注CFOS，請?jiān)L問http://CFOS.ruc.edu.cn。
 
時(shí)間：2016年3月30日（周三）12：00－13：30
地點(diǎn)：明德主樓734會(huì)議室
主講：陳婷
主題：Do Land Revenue Windfalls Create A Political Resource Curse? Evidence from China（土地財(cái)政是否創(chuàng)造了政治的資源詛咒：來自中國的證據(jù)）
摘要：By analyzing a panel on the political turnovers of 4,390 county leaders in China during 1999–2008, we find that the revenue windfalls accrued to these officials from land sales have both undermined the effectiveness of the promotion system for government officials and fueled corruption. Instead of rewarding efforts made to boost GDP growth, promotion is positively correlated with signaling efforts, with those politically connected to their superiors and those beyond the prime age for promotion being the primary beneficiaries. Likewise, land revenue windfalls have led to increases in the size of bureaucracy and administrative expenditure—corruption in short.
 
演講者簡介：Chen Ting is currently postdoctoral fellow at the Social Science Division in the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, from where she completed her doctoral defense in 2015 fall. Her research interests lie in political economy, economic history and development economics. In her dissertation, she has been conducting studies over a broad range of research topics concerning about local official’s turnover, political connection and corruption. Recently, with coauthors, she started a new project examining the long-term persistence of Imperial Exam (Keju) on contemporary human capital accumulation.
 
 
中國人民大學(xué)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)院 人大企業(yè)與組織研究中心 國發(fā)院新政治經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)研究中心 人大微觀數(shù)據(jù)與實(shí)證方法研究中心 2016年3月28日