[勞動經濟學研討會]“I (Eye)`` on You: In-group Favoritism in a Dictator Game
發文時間:2017-10-19

         勞動經濟學研討會          (總第46期)      
 
 
 
      【時間】2017年10月20日(周五)11:40-13:10          【地點】明德主樓734會議室          【主題】“I (Eye)`` on You: In-group Favoritism in a Dictator Game          【主講】鄭金笛 (University of Amsterdam, CREED)          
         【Abstract】It is a well-established result in the literature that being observed by others already affects pro-social behavior. Less research, however, has shed light on the heterogeneity of such effect. Does it matter whether someone is observed by an in-group member, or by an out-group member? The same question applies to parties who directly benefit from such pro-social behaviors. The answer is important for charitable fundraising strategy, for instance. In a laboratory experiment, we test the effect of different identities in a dictator game. We do so by creating in-group and out-group in the laboratory, using a variation of the minimum-group paradigm. Varying the group composition, we conduct a one-shot dictator game with a passive observer. There are four scenarios (treatments) among the dictator, the recipient and the observer: 1) three of them are in-group, 2) the observer is out-group, 3) the recipient is out-group, and 4) the dictator is out-group. The results show that dictators in scenario 4 give less than those in the other three scenarios, whereas there are insignificant differences in the dictators? giving in the other three scenarios. This illustrates that dictators give more to the recipient when at least either recipient or the observer is in-group. When the dictator is matched with an in-group recipient and an in-group observer, however, no additional dictator giving is observed. (joint with Anita Kopányi-Peuker)                     主講人簡介:鄭金笛,荷蘭阿姆斯特丹大學博士生(2018年畢業),研究領域為實驗經濟學、行為經濟學、社會身份和應用微觀經濟學,美國加州大學圣地亞哥分校訪問學者。