[組織經濟學Workshop]The Agency Cost of Internal Collusion and Schumpeterian Growth
發文時間:2015-09-17
中國人民大學企業與組織研究中心 組織經濟學Workshop 【OE2015015】

組織經濟學(Organizational Economics)Workshop由中國人民大學企業與組織研究中心(CFOS)主辦。CFOS的宗旨是,關注組織經濟學前沿研究,利用現代經濟學方法研究中國的企業、政府、市場和非營利組織的重大問題,推動企業理論、契約理論和制度經濟學的研究與教學。關注CFOS,請訪問http://CFOS.ruc.edu.cn。


時間:2015年9月17日(周四)14:00-16:00
地點:明德主樓0304
主持:楊其靜(中國人民大學經濟學院教授)、聶輝華(中國人民大學經濟學院教授)
主講:張雨瀟 
主講論文題目:The Agency Cost of Internal Collusion and Schumpeterian Growth(David Martimort and Thierry Verdier,2004)
摘要:This paper analyses the link between the internal organization of the firm and the growth process. We present a Schumpeterian growth model in which monopoly firms face agency costs due to collusion between managers inside the organization. These costs affect incentives to invest and the rate of innovation in the economy. When collusion is self-enforcing, higher growth and more creative destruction shortens in turn the time horizon of colluding agents in the organization and makes internal collusion more difficult to sustain. We analyze this two-way mechanism between growth and agency problems and show how the transaction costs of side-contracting within the firm and the growth rate of the economy are simultaneously derived.






中國人民大學經濟學院 人大企業與組織研究中心 2015年9月17日