[宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)研討會]Constrained Discretion and Central Bank Transparency
發(fā)文時間:2017-11-21

     【ECON20171219】  
      宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)研討會          (總第234期)      
【時間】2017年11月22日(周三)12:15-13:45  
【地點】明商0202教室  
【主講】周璇 中國人民大學(xué)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)院助理教授  
【主題】 Constrained Discretion and Central Bank Transparency(F. Bianchi & L. Melosi, FRB of Chicago Working Paper, 2016)  
【摘要】We develop and estimate a general equilibrium model in which monetary policy can deviate from active inflation stabilization and agents face uncertainty about the nature of these deviations. When observing a deviation, agents conduct Bayesian learning to infer its likely duration. Under constrained discretion, only short deviations occur: Agents are confident about a prompt return to the active regime, macroeconomic uncertainty is low, welfare is high. However, if a deviation persists, agents’ beliefs start drifting, uncertainty accelerates, and welfare declines. If the duration of the deviations is announced, uncertainty follows a reverse path. For the U.S. transparency lowers uncertainty and increases welfare.  
【主持】陳彥斌 教授  
 
 
    人大宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)研討會(Macro Workshop)旨在追蹤宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)國際最新進(jìn)展,倡導(dǎo)構(gòu)建符合國情的動態(tài)優(yōu)化模型,并使用計算機(jī)模擬研究經(jīng)濟(jì)增長、收入分配和宏觀政策等中國宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)重大問題。  
聯(lián)系人:劉哲希    Email:Macro_Workshop@163.com  
資料下載:www.docin.com/mydoc-88265459-1.html  
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      中國人民大學(xué)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)院          中國經(jīng)濟(jì)改革與發(fā)展研究院