產業經濟學seminar

【時間】2017年6月29日（周四）12：00－13：30

【地點】明主734會議室  
 
【主講】李志赟  Assistant Professor in Economics  
                        Durham University Business School  
【主題】Sequential Search Auction with a Deadline  
【點評】李三希 中國人民大學經濟學院副教授  
【摘要】Many sale mechanisms involve multiple rounds of transactions with a deadline, such as in takeovers.  In this paper, we investigate such a problem in a sequential auction context.  In our model, specifically, a seller allocates an indivisible product among potential bidders within finite periods, and to invite a bidder, the seller needs to pay a positive cost.  The sequential search mechanism is composed of a sequence of auction reserve prices, and that of bidder samples.  
 
We first show that there exists a symmetric cutoff equilibrium for bidders, and the optimal search procedure can be implemented by a sequence of second price auctions with properly set reserves.  Second, the optimal value cutoffs, as well as optimal reserve prices, are descending overtime, which are related only to the value of the bidders in the immediately following period.  Our formulation generalizes the classic reservation prize in sequential search problems (Weitzman, 1979).  Third, the optimal sampling strategy is characterized by increasing search intensity overtime.  In another word, it is optimal for the seller to invite fewer bidders in the earlier stages, while invite increasingly more bidders when it approaches the deadline.   
 
We also investigate the efficient search mechanism, and show that the efficient search procedure is featured by lower cutoffs and search intensity, when compared with the corresponding outcomes of the optimal search mechanism.  
   
【主講人介紹】李志赟  
Employment: Assistant Professor in Economics，Durham University Business School  
在國內《經濟研究》上獨立作者發表的文章是北京大學引用次數最高的十篇文章之一，達到1203次。  
 
 
歡迎相關領域老師和同學關注并參加！如有意作為點評老師或宣講學生參加前沿文獻選讀活動，可以聯系經濟學院李三希老師（sanxi@ruc.edu.cn）或者學生助理陳奕辰（chenyichen@ruc.edu.cn）。