[宏觀經(jīng)濟學(xué)研討會]Optimal Time-Consistent Macroprudential Policy
發(fā)文時間:2014-12-08
[ECON20141222]
宏觀經(jīng)濟學(xué)研討會 (總第173期)

【時間】2014年12月10日(周三)12:15-13:45
【地點】明商0302教室
【主講】林煒  中國人民大學(xué)經(jīng)濟學(xué)院
【點評】劉凱  中國人民大學(xué)經(jīng)濟學(xué)院助理教授、英國劍橋大學(xué)經(jīng)濟學(xué)博士
【主題】 Optimal Time-Consistent Macroprudential Policy (written by Javier Bianchi and Enrique G. Mendoza, NBER Working Paper,2013)
【摘要】Collateral constraints widely used in models of financial crises feature a pecuniary externality, because agents do not internalize how collateral prices respond to collective borrowing decisions, particularly when binding collateral constraints trigger a crisis. We show that agents in a competitive equilibrium borrow "too much" during credit expansions compared with a financial regulator who internalizes this externality. Under commitment, however, this regulator faces a time inconsistency problem: It promises low future consumption to prop up current asset prices when collateral constraints bind, but this is not optimal ex post. Instead, we study the optimal, time-consistent policy of a regulator who cannot commit to future policies. Quantitative analysis shows that this policy reduces the incidence and magnitude of crises, removes fat tails from the distribution of returns and reduces risk premia.
【主持】陳彥斌 教授


人大宏觀經(jīng)濟學(xué)研討會(Macro Workshop)旨在追蹤宏觀經(jīng)濟學(xué)國際最新進展,倡導(dǎo)構(gòu)建符合國情的動態(tài)優(yōu)化模型,并使用計算機模擬研究經(jīng)濟增長、收入分配和宏觀政策等中國宏觀經(jīng)濟重大問題。


聯(lián)系人:郭豫媚    Email:Macro_Workshop@163.com
資料下載:www.docin.com/mydoc-88265459-1.html
更多講座信息請訪問:www.dehf4y.cn,www.yanjiuyuan.com.cn






經(jīng)濟學(xué)院 中國經(jīng)濟改革與發(fā)展研究院