【摘要】：This paper investigates whether social image concern affects the level of indirect reciprocity in one-shot interaction. Indirect reciprocity refers to the case that a donor helps a recipient, but the recipient can only reciprocate to an anonymous

beneficiary. We design a laboratory experiment of the above game, but vary whether the donor can observe the recipient’s repayment amount to the beneficiary. We find that the observable repayment condition significantly increases the recipient’s transfer. The increase is largely attributed to the more significant effect of the donor sending a message requesting favorable treatment, and slightly due to social connection between the donor and the beneficiary outside of the laboratory. These results show the importance of social image concern and the specific channels it functions through.

主講人介紹：梁平漢博士2010年畢業(yè)于西班牙巴塞羅那自治大學(xué)獲得經(jīng)濟學(xué)博士學(xué)位，主要研究領(lǐng)域為博弈論、政治經(jīng)濟學(xué)、實驗經(jīng)濟學(xué)、組織經(jīng)濟學(xué)、發(fā)展經(jīng)濟學(xué)。已經(jīng)在中英文核心刊物發(fā)表若干學(xué)術(shù)論文，并擔(dān)任多家英文學(xué)術(shù)刊物審稿人。

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