[ECON20141115]

中國人民大學(xué)企業(yè)與組織研究中心

組織經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)Seminar


      組織經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)（Organizational Economics）Seminar由中國人民大學(xué)企業(yè)與組織研究中心（CFOS）主辦。CFOS的宗旨是，利用現(xiàn)代經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)方法研究中國的企業(yè)、政府、市場(chǎng)和非營(yíng)利組織的重大問題，推動(dòng)企業(yè)理論、契約理論和制度經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)的研究與教學(xué)。關(guān)注CFOS，請(qǐng)?jiān)L問http://CFOS.ruc.edu.cn。


時(shí)間：2014年12月29日（周一）12：00－13：30
地點(diǎn)：明德主樓734會(huì)議室
主持：楊其靜教授
主講：?jiǎn)萄?
主題：Career Concern: Beijing Style
摘要：We study a model of overlapping principal-agent problems, where one of yesterday`s agents would be selected/promoted as today`s principal, who then wields absolute power free of checks and balances, and has discretion over how to select/promote one of today`s agents as tomorrow`s principal. We use this model to theorize how a political system building on career concerns instead of checks and balances may function. We call this a model of career concerns, Beijing style, which differs fundamentally from one of career concerns, Holmstrom style, in that the disciplinary effect of career concerns exhibits inherent indeterminacy. The proper functioning of such a political system also relies on strong enough state capacity and an intermediate level of decentralization. Small improvement in the rule of law or a mandatory merit-based promotion rule may inadvertently render such a political system unworkable.


演講者簡(jiǎn)介：?jiǎn)萄绹鳬owa State University經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)博士，現(xiàn)任教于清華大學(xué)經(jīng)濟(jì)與管理學(xué)院。她的主要研究領(lǐng)域?yàn)橹袊?jīng)濟(jì)與政治經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)，健康、預(yù)期壽命與經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展以及中國就業(yè)流動(dòng)，目前主持國家自科基金青年項(xiàng)目《失業(yè)保險(xiǎn)對(duì)勞動(dòng)力市場(chǎng)的影響及其最優(yōu)設(shè)計(jì)》和面上項(xiàng)目《老齡化和人口政策對(duì)我國教育和人力資本積累、養(yǎng)老保障和經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)的影響》。她已在Journal of Public Economics，Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Macroeconomic Dynamics, Journal of Economics等重要國際學(xué)術(shù)期刊上發(fā)表7篇論文，并在《經(jīng)濟(jì)研究》、《世界經(jīng)濟(jì)》、《金融研究》等國內(nèi)著名期刊上發(fā)表多篇學(xué)術(shù)論文。




中國人民大學(xué)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)院 人大企業(yè)與組織研究中心 2014年12月25日