中國人民大學(xué)企業(yè)與組織研究中心 組織經(jīng)濟學(xué)Seminar

總第55期 【OE201502】

組織經(jīng)濟學(xué)（Organizational Economics）Seminar由中國人民大學(xué)企業(yè)與組織研究中心（CFOS）主辦。CFOS的宗旨是，利用現(xiàn)代經(jīng)濟學(xué)方法研究中國的企業(yè)、政府、市場和非營利組織的重大問題，推動企業(yè)理論、契約理論和制度經(jīng)濟學(xué)的研究與教學(xué)。關(guān)注CFOS，請訪問http://CFOS.ruc.edu.cn。


時間：2015年5月13日（周三）12：00－13：30
地點：明德主樓734會議室
主持人：謝倫裕 博士
主講：謝陽
主題：Machiavellian Experimentation
摘要：Motivated by the choice of strategy during decisive moments in history, we analyze a common situation of collective decision making in the presence of heterogeneous beliefs in which any decision other than the default option requires unanimity. We note that, when heterogeneous beliefs exist, decision makers could be rewarded or punished for being proven correct or incorrect by experimentation. We show that, when decision makers care strongly about potential rewards and punishments, they will agree to experimentation if, and only if, they have diametrically opposite beliefs, but not if they hold moderate beliefs. We illustrate our model with two examples: the disagreement within the leadership of the Allied Forces on the Western Front of World War II in the autumn of 1944 and the decision making process of the Chinese leadership during the country`s transition starting in the late 1970s.


演講者簡介：謝陽，美國加州大學(xué)伯克利分校在讀博士。他的主要研究領(lǐng)域為比較經(jīng)濟學(xué)、商品市場、產(chǎn)業(yè)組織。他已在Proceedings of the 17th World Congress of the International Economic Association和Computational Economics上發(fā)表論文，并擔(dān)任Journal of Comparative Economics和Water Economics and Policy雜志的審稿人。




中國人民大學(xué)經(jīng)濟學(xué)院 人大企業(yè)與組織研究中心 2015年5月11日