中國(guó)人民大學(xué)企業(yè)與組織研究中心 組織經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)Workshop
【OE2015017】

    組織經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)（Organizational Economics）Workshop由中國(guó)人民大學(xué)企業(yè)與組織研究中心（CFOS）主辦。CFOS的宗旨是，關(guān)注組織經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)前沿研究，利用現(xiàn)代經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)方法研究中國(guó)的企業(yè)、政府、市場(chǎng)和非營(yíng)利組織的重大問(wèn)題，推動(dòng)企業(yè)理論、契約理論和制度經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)的研究與教學(xué)。關(guān)注CFOS，請(qǐng)?jiān)L問(wèn)http://CFOS.ruc.edu.cn。


時(shí)間：2015年10月8日（周四）14：00－16：00
地點(diǎn)：明德主樓0304
主持：楊其靜（中國(guó)人民大學(xué)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)院教授）、聶輝華（中國(guó)人民大學(xué)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)院教授）
主講：董博
主講論文題目：Platform Competition in Two-sided Markets（Jean-Charles Rochet and Jean Tirole，2003）
摘要：Many if not most markets with network externalities are two-sided. To succeed, platforms in industries such as software, portals and media, payment systems and the Internet, must "get both sides of the market on board." Accordingly, platforms devote much attention to their business model, that is, to how they court each side while making money overall. This paper builds a model of platform competition with two-sided markets. It unveils the determinants of price allocation and end-user surplus for different governance structures (profit-maximizing platforms and not-for-profit joint undertakings), and compares the outcomes with those under an integrated monopolist and a Ramsey planner.




中國(guó)人民大學(xué)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)院 人大企業(yè)與組織研究中心 2015年10月7日