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組織經(jīng)濟學(xué)seminar第149期

題目：Optimal Mechanisms for a Value Maximizer: The Futility of Screening Targets(價值最大化者的最優(yōu)機制：篩選目標(biāo)的徒勞)

時間：2024年10月15日14:00-15:00

地點：教學(xué)二樓2114

匯報人：左淞（谷歌高級研究員）

主持人：鄺仲弘（中國人民大學(xué)經(jīng)濟學(xué)院副教授）

摘要：Motivated by the increased adoption of autobidding algorithms in internet advertising markets, we study the design of optimal mechanisms for selling an item to a value-maximizing buyer with a return-on-spend constraint. The buyer's values and target ratio in the returnon-spend constraint are private. We restrict attention to deterministic sequential screening mechanisms that can be implemented as a menu of two-part tariffs. The main result of this paper is to provide a characterization of an optimal mechanism. Surprisingly, we show that the optimal mechanism does not require target screening, i.e., offering a single two-part tariff is optimal for the seller. The optimal mechanism is a subsidized two-part tariff that provides a lump-sum subsidy to the buyer to encourage participation and then charges a fixed unit price for each item sold. The seller's problem is a challenging non-linear mechanism design problem, and a key technical contribution of our work is to provide a novel approach to analyzing non-linear pricing contracts for constrained buyers. Our results have valuable implications for advertising platforms seeking to personalize pricing decisions based on advertisers' characteristics.

個人簡介：左淞，谷歌研究科學(xué)家。他的主要研究領(lǐng)域為機制設(shè)計、互聯(lián)網(wǎng)廣告拍賣與自動競價。他曾獲得2017年谷歌博士獎學(xué)金。2018年，左淞從清華大學(xué)交叉信息研究院“姚班”畢業(yè)，并獲得博士學(xué)位。