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題目：Preference Evolution under Partner Choice

時間：2024年11月27日10:30-12:00

地點：明德主樓734

匯報人：王子偉（北京大學光華管理學院博雅博士后）

主持人：趙瑋（中國人民大學經濟學院講師）

摘要：We present a model that investigates preference evolution with endogenous matching. In the short-run, individuals' subjective preferences influence partner selection and behavior in social interactions, impacting material payoffs. These payoffs, in turn, affect how preferences evolve in the long-run. To properly model the "match-to-interact" process, we combine stable matching and equilibrium concepts. Our analysis unveils that endogenous matching gives rise to a class of preferences that exhibit both homophily and efficiency. Such preferences stand out in the evolutionary process because they are able to force positive assortative matching and efficient play. Under incomplete information, a strong form of homophily, parochialism, is necessary for a preference to prevail in evolution, because stronger incentives are required to engage in self-sorting with information friction.

個人簡介：王子偉，北京大學光華管理學院博雅博士后，威斯康星大學麥迪遜分校經濟學博士。主要研究領域為博弈論，匹配理論和信息經濟學。研究成果發表于經濟學國際期刊Social Choice and Welfare，并且有多篇論文處于返修階段。擔任Games and Economic Behavior，Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization，Journal of Economic Theory等期刊的匿名審稿人，現主持國家自然科學基金青年項目一項。