[能源經濟學研討會]Is the Leading Role Desirable? - A Simulation Analysis of the Stackelberg Behavior in World Petroleum Market
發文時間:2012-04-22

能源經濟學研討會

時間:52日,周三, 12:00-2:00   

地點:明德主樓734

題目:

Is the Leading Role Desirable? - A Simulation Analysis of the Stackelberg Behavior in World Petroleum Market

文章摘要:

This article explores extraction profiles in the Stackelberg equilibrium of exhaustible resource industry. Calibrated with real data of world petroleum market, the Stackelberg and Cournot-Nash equilibriums are solved numerically. The properties of the Stackelberg equilibrium are compared and contrasted with the benchmark open-loop Cournot-Nash equilibrium. Simulation results indicate that the leader?s gains are limited in the Stackelberg strategic setting. Methodologically, this article pioneers solving the Stackelberg game numerically in a dynamic and empirical model. 

作者簡介

Zili Yang, professor of Department of Economics, State University of New York at Binghamton. His research focuses on resource and environmental economics, energy economics, economic modeling, applied game theory, public economics and Chinese economy.

 

 中國人民大學 經濟學院能源經濟系