[宏觀(guān)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)討論班]Optimal Interventions in Markets with Adverse Selection](總第107期)
發(fā)文時(shí)間:2012-02-29

宏觀(guān)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)討論班

總第107期

中國(guó)人民大學(xué)宏觀(guān)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)討論班(Macroeconomics Seminar)旨在追蹤宏觀(guān)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)國(guó)際最新進(jìn)展,倡導(dǎo)構(gòu)建符合國(guó)情的動(dòng)態(tài)優(yōu)化模型(尤其是Bewley模型)并使用計(jì)算機(jī)模擬研究中國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)改革與發(fā)展的重大問(wèn)題。

【時(shí)間】2012年3月6日(周二)12:15-13:45

【地點(diǎn)】明主0304教室

【主持】陳彥斌教授

【主講】陳偉澤

【主題】Optimal Interventions in Markets with Adverse Selection

【摘要】We study the design of interventions to stabilize financial markets plagued by adverse selection. Our contribution is to analyze the information revealed by participation decisions. Taking part in a government program carries a stigma, and outside options are mechanism-dependent. We show that the efficiency of an intervention can be assessed by its impact on the market interest rate. The presence of an outside market determines the nature of optimal interventions and the choice of financial instruments (debt guarantees in our model), but it does not affect implementation costs.

  

聯(lián)系人:姚一旻

Yaoyimin123@sina.com

經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)院

中國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)改革與發(fā)展研究院