[組織經濟學Seminar]Shifts of Distortion and Corruption over Local Political Cycles in China
發文時間:2015-12-21
中國人民大學企業與組織研究中心 組織經濟學Seminar 總第68期  【OE201515】

組織經濟學(Organizational Economics)Seminar由中國人民大學企業與組織研究中心(CFOS)主辦。CFOS的宗旨是,利用現代經濟學方法研究中國的企業、政府、市場和非營利組織的重大問題,推動企業理論、契約理論和制度經濟學的研究與教學。關注CFOS,請訪問http://CFOS.ruc.edu.cn。
時間:2015年12月24日(周四)12:00-13:30
地點:明主729
主講:陳曉光(中國人民大學財金學院講師、西澳大學商學院助理教授)
主題:Shifts of Distortion and Corruption over Local Political Cycles in China
摘要:Do corrupt firms create negative externality and hurt less corrupt ones? I answer this question by exploring cross-industry distribution of taxation, credit, and corruption over local political cycles in China. It is known that capital-intensive firms are more likely to be corrupt. The paper argues that preferential treatment in taxation or credit allocation towards corrupt firms must result in detrimental treatment against others when governments face resource constraints, and that corruption is generally conducted through political network that expands and shrinks over political cycles. Using the variation in turnover of secretaries of the Chinese Communist Party in 275 prefectures between 2000 and 2007, I find that, as the tenure of the secretaries increases, enforcement of both VAT and corporate income tax as well as access to credit all change in favour of capital-intensive industries but to the detriment of labour-intensive counterparts. I then use the firm-level Entertainment and Travel Cost (ETC) as a proxy of corruption and find that the variation of cross-industry distribution of ETC over secretaries’ tenure is in line with the variation in taxation and credit allocation. The finding suggests that corruption may not reduce overall distortions in the economy but only shifts distortions across economic agents.


演講者簡介:陳曉光,中國人民大學財金學院講師、西澳大學商學院助理教授,主要研究領域為發展與增長、公共金融、中國經濟,曾在《中國社會科學》、《經濟研究》、《經濟學季刊》發表過多篇文章,曾榮獲中國留美經濟學會2005年“鄒至莊最佳經濟學論文獎”。


中國人民大學經濟學院 人大企業與組織研究中心 人大微觀數據與實證方法研究中心 2015年12月21日