中國(guó)人民大學(xué)企業(yè)與組織研究中心

組織經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)Seminar

【SE2012S04】

時(shí)間：2012年4月18日（周三）12：00－13：30

地點(diǎn)：明德主樓734會(huì)議室

主講：王哲偉

主題：Optimal Punishment in Contests with Endogenous Entry

摘要：

We study optimal punishments in an effort-maximizing all-pay contest with a fixed prize and endogenous entry. When a small punishment is introduced, the lowest ability players drop out and those of medium ability make less effort, while only the highest ability players make more effort. A sufficient condition is given for the optimal punishment to be zero if the contest designer wishes to maximize expected total effort. However, when the objective is to maximize the expected highest individual effort, a positive punishment is desirable under much weaker conditions, and in particular if there are a sufficient number of players.

演講者簡(jiǎn)介：王哲偉，現(xiàn)為山東大學(xué)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)院講師。他于英國(guó)愛丁堡大學(xué)獲得經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)碩士和博士學(xué)位，研究領(lǐng)域?yàn)楦?jìng)賽與沖突理論、博弈論和拍賣理論等，曾在B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics等雜志上發(fā)表論文。

組織經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)（Organizational Economics）Seminar由中國(guó)人民大學(xué)企業(yè)與組織研究中心（CFOS）主辦。CFOS的宗旨是，利用現(xiàn)代經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)方法研究中國(guó)的企業(yè)、政府、市場(chǎng)和非營(yíng)利組織的重大問(wèn)題，推動(dòng)企業(yè)理論、契約理論和制度經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)的研究與教學(xué)。關(guān)注CFOS，請(qǐng)?jiān)L問(wèn)http://CFOS.ruc.edu.cn。

項(xiàng)目協(xié)調(diào)人：聶輝華，niehuihua(at)gmail.com

中國(guó)人民大學(xué)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)院

人大企業(yè)與組織研究中心

2012年4月13日