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題目：Screening Network Degrees: Optimal Network Interventions under Asymmetric Information

時間：2024年11月8日10:30-12:00

地點：立德樓702

匯報人：石凡奇（北京大學經濟學院助理教授）

主持人：趙瑋（中國人民大學經濟學院講師）

摘要：We propose a novel screening approach to study network interventions in product markets characterized by positive network externalities, where agents possess private information regarding their network degrees-specifically, susceptibility and influence. Under incentive-compatible constraints, we demonstrate that the principal can directly screen agents based on susceptibility, but can only indirectly infer their expected influence. Based on this simplification, we fully characterize the optimal intervention policies for both a profit-maximizing monopolist seller and a welfare-maximizing social planner. In the case of quadratic intrinsic value, we further derive insights into the optimal allocation, pricing patterns and profit/welfare gain from screening. Our analysis not only offers practical guidance for implementing network-based interventions in product markets with positive network externalities, but also sheds light on the value of network information.

個人簡介：石凡奇，北京大學經濟學院助理教授，博士畢業于斯坦福大學。研究側重機制設計及其應用。論文發表于RAND Journal of Economics, Games and Economic Behavior等期刊，目前主持國家自然科學基金青年項目。