國民經(jīng)濟學seminar

    中國人民大學經(jīng)濟學院國民經(jīng)濟學seminar將于2017年4月27日中午12點在明德主樓623召開。屆時山東大學Roland Cheo教授和李菁萍助理教授將對實驗經(jīng)濟學和行為經(jīng)濟學研究成果做學術(shù)報告。

報告人簡介：

    Roland Cheo，山東大學經(jīng)濟研究院教授，澳大利亞莫納什大學（Monash University）經(jīng)濟學博士，曾任新加坡國立大學經(jīng)濟學系研究員。主要從事實驗經(jīng)濟學、行為經(jīng)濟學和博弈論研究，先后在Economic Letters、International Review of Economics等期刊上發(fā)表數(shù)篇論文。

   李菁萍，山東大學經(jīng)濟研究院講師，新加坡國立大學經(jīng)濟學博士。主要從事實驗經(jīng)濟學、行為經(jīng)濟學研究，關(guān)注慈善捐贈、性別差異和利他性行為，研究論文在Economic Inquiry等國際期刊上發(fā)表。

報告內(nèi)容簡介：

Roland Cheo教授的報告主題為：Contributing Time and Effort in Public or Minding My Business in Private? Answers from a Real Effort Public Goods Task:                  This paper therefore provides a new experimental design which de-emphasizes monetary contributions into the public account, while retaining the essential features of the public goods game. Instead of the stylised task of the public goods game, we base our experiment on one real effort cognitive task: solving a jigsaw puzzle, in order to see how contributions vary according to the level of cognitive effort needed to render help to strangers.              Our main results show that contributions hurt performance in the private account, while helping others complete the tasks faster.This gives evidence that people are willing to help others to their own detriment. This observation cannot be gleaned from the standard public goods game alone because the private account in the standard public goods game is a guaranteed amount, and contributions may be motivated as an act of charity above and beyond this minimum amount. As task complexity increases, this helping behavior in the real task persists and even strengthens.

李菁萍助理教授的報告主題為：Do unto others as others do unto me?: voice matters：

    Do we penalise an innocent outsider when we have been unfairly dealt with? On the other hand, do we reward outsiders when we have been treated well? In this paper, we investigate the effect of voice on the decisions of recipients who become dictators in a two-stage three-person dictator game. In the first stage, the randomly assigned dicator shares a pie with a randomly assigned recipient. This recipient then plays the role of ‘sender` in the second stage dictator game with an outsider. We find that these recipients-turned-dictators` transfers are not significantly different from the dictators in the first stage, though they are highly correlated. When recipient in the first stage, after receiving their transfers are allowed to leave a private message to their dictators, when it is their turn to become dictators, the amount they transfer increases significantly. Further evidence shows that having voice mainly impacts the future decisions of recipients who received a low amount in the first stage. Voice also reduces the level of correlation between first stage dictator`s and the second stage recipient-turned-dictators` transfers.

報告將采取PPT展示和演講等形式，歡迎積極參加。

         
         中國人民大學經(jīng)濟學院          北京市海淀區(qū)中關(guān)村大街59號          郵編：100872