數量經濟學研討會  
題目：A Fundamental Error or Logical Flaw in Existing Noncooperative Game Theory 報告人：趙進鋼 教授  時間： 2016年6月21日（周二） 10:00-12:00 地點：明德樓主樓623會議室 Abstract：Dr. Lloyd Shapley passed away on March 12, 2016. He was called Mr. Game Theory, and won the 2012 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences with Alvin Roth "for the theory of stable allocations and the practice of market design." He received the Bronze Star decoration, for breaking the Soviet weather code in Chengdu during the Chinese Resistance War against Japanese Invasion.     This study uses three little-known and yet still significant contributions of Lloyd Shapley to make three corrections in the literature. This presentation focuses on one of such corrections, which formalizes Shapley’s argument (1987) as a fundamental error or logical flaw in several areas of existing noncooperative game theory. The error centers on two assumptions:     A1: Players are able to take collective actions in choosing their choices; and     A2: Players are unable to take any coordinated or collective action in choosing their choices. A2 characterizes the nature of Prisoner’s Dilemma game in which the two players have no access to any communication or coordination. If they could coordinate their choices by communicating with each other or make deals by using a joint counsel, the nature of the game will become that characterized by A1 and thus invalidate the Nash equilibrium predicted by A2. Although A1 and A2 determine a player’s rationality and are the foundations upon which game solutions are built, they have often been ignored or misunderstood in a large number of previous studies。 報告人簡介：趙進鋼教授本科畢業于北京航天航空大學數學系(77級)、碩士畢業于中國人民大學數量經濟學專業(81級)，是第一位在耶魯大學獲得經濟博士(92年)的大陸學者，現任加拿大薩省大學經濟學終身教授。主講微觀經濟，博弈論，一般均衡等課程。在博弈論、產業組織等領域取得多項創建性成果。他創建的分合解 (hybrid solution)包含納什均衡和合作解兩個特例(Games and Economic Behavior，1992)，是分析聯盟關系、“分久必合，合久必分”規律等最深刻博弈問題的基本工具。分合博弈、網絡博弈和信息經濟學(hybrid game，network game and information economics)曾被美國經濟協會的期刊(Journal of Economic Perspective)在2000年預測為21世紀微觀經濟理論的重要前沿課題。他最先用合作博弈分析兼并行為，使得非空核(nonempty core)和盈利能力(profitability)并列成為研究企業兼并等企業合作行為的兩大基石(Theory and Decision，2009)。