[勞動經濟學研討會]Financial Incentives and Physician Prescribing Behavior
發文時間:2017-06-01

         勞動經濟學研討會          (總第44期)      
      【時間】2017年6月8日(周四)12:00-13:30          【地點】明德主樓729會議室          【主題】Financial Incentives and Physician Prescribing Behavior—Evidence from the Regulatory Change of Healthcare Price Structure in China          【主講】付明衛(中國社科院經濟研究所副研究員)          【Abstract】  This paper empirically investigates how financial incentives affect physician prescribing behavior in an environment that physicians both prescribe and dispense medicine. Our identification strategy employs an exogenous policy shock which abolishes the 15% markup on drug sales and raises the visit fee by a large margin at the same time. Using a regression discontinuity design based on patient-visit-level data, we find that the policy shock leads to an 6.7% decrease in total expenditure per visit on average. Not only the abolishment of markup drives the decline in total expenditure, but also that the rise in the visit fee dampens physicians` over-pre1111ion. Exactly, the variety of medicine prescribed by physician reduces by 0.15, and spending on examination and check decreases on the order of 13.3%. There exists heterogeneity in the effect of the shock among diseases.                     主講人簡介:付明衛,中國社科院經濟研究所副研究員,經濟學博士,美國賓州州立大學訪問學者,研究興趣為醫療衛生和鄉村治理,在《經濟研究》、《世界經濟》和《金融研究》等期刊發表論文多篇。